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21 Introduction
This paper analyzes how cartels can be stabilized by collective wage agreements
that introduce ineﬃcient intra-ﬁrm incentives. Cartel agreements in Cournot
oligopolies suﬀer from an inherent instability: no cartel solution is a Nash equi-
librium. Thus, each competitor has an incentive to choose an output greater
than his cartel quota. Moreover, cartel agreements are in general not legally
enforceable.1
This analysis rests on the assumption that production takes place in the
absence of intra-ﬁrm conﬂicts. In our paper, we acknowledge that intra-ﬁrm
conﬂicts which result from delegation and moral hazard problems may exist in
oligopolistic ﬁrms. These conﬂicts are modeled as principal-agent problems. The
principal is unable to choose the ﬁrm’s output directly, but can inﬂuence it by
choosing appropriate variable payments (“piece rates”) and ﬁxed wages. Thus,
the ﬁrm owners face two problems: the instability of a cartel, and the intra-ﬁrm
conﬂict with their respective agents. We demonstrate that these two problems
do not reinforce each other. To the contrary, the principals can stabilize their
cartel by providing ineﬃcient intra-ﬁrm incentives.
In a world with risk neutral agents and risk neutral principals, eﬃcient intra-
ﬁrm incentives can easily be achieved when the agent is assigned the position
of the residual claimant. If the principal has complete bargaining power, he
can attain the complete cooperation rent via the ﬁxed wage. A contract that
provides a piece rate smaller than the eﬃcient one for the risk neutral agent
implements lower than eﬃcient eﬀort. The ﬁrm’s output is, c.p., smaller than
under a ﬁrst-best contract.2
Consider a two-stage interaction: during the ﬁrst stage, the Cournot com-
petitors close an agreement about intra-ﬁrm incentives. In the second stage,
outputs are produced and sold. The ﬁrms can, during the ﬁrst stage, calibrate
the intra-ﬁrm incentives ineﬃciently and establish the cartel solution as a Nash
equilibrium in the second stage. However, such an agreement is not a subgame
perfect equilibrium in the two stage game. Each ﬁrm had an incentive to deviate
by oﬀering eﬃcient intra-ﬁrm incentives to its own agents, even if all other ﬁrms
did obey the agreement. With respect to this instability problem, there is no
diﬀerence between an indirect cartel agreement in wages and the direct cartel
in output quotas.
1The shadow of the future may induce cartel agreements as Nash equilibria. In this paper,
we focus on one-shot games. In repeated games, however, the non-trivial problem of equilib-
rium selection arises because the cartel supergame has an inﬁnite number of Pareto-eﬃcient
Nash equilibria.
2A similar result would be achieved if a risk-averse agent is employed instead of a risk neu-
tral one: only second-best solutions are attainable, because a trade-oﬀ between risk allocation
and incentives cannot be circumvented. A third variation of intra-ﬁrm ineﬃciency would be
an organization with many agents: if the compensation for these agents is characterized by
a budget-balanced sharing rule, this induces ineﬃcient intra-ﬁrm incentives, see Holmstrom
(1982).
3Yet, there is a simple and legal way to solve the instability problem of the
indirect cartel agreement. All Cournot competitors may agree upon an indus-
try wide collective wage agreement with a labor union in order to establish
minimum wages and thereby introduce ineﬃcient intra-ﬁrm incentives. The
important diﬀerence between a direct cartel agreement and a collective wage
agreement is that the latter can be legally enforced. If the ﬁrms have full bar-
gaining power and can make a take-it or leave-it oﬀer, then the indirect cartel
agreement enables them to divide the full monopoly proﬁt among them. Even
if the Union demands a share of the cartel proﬁt for its members, the Nash
bargaining solution would guarantee each competitor a share that is at least as
large as its proﬁt under the Cournot solution.
Section 2 presents the related literature. The model we set up in section
3 acknowledges the presence of intra-ﬁrm conﬂicts within each ﬁrm. These
conﬂicts have to be solved by incentive contracts. Therefore, we re-model the
Cournot duopoly as a game in wages rather than in outputs in section 3.1. We
derive the agents’ reactions to contract oﬀers, the duopolists’ reaction curves in
piece rates, and the decentralized Cournot solution in section 3.2. In section 3.3,
we demonstrate the monopolistic cartel agreement in wages and its instability.
Furthermore, we prove that an enforceable collective agreement on minimum
wages may stabilize the cartel solution. Finally, we demonstrate the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution between labor union and employers association (in
section 3.4). In section 4, we draw conclusions.
2 Related literature
Papers on the principal-agent problem, as well as on oligopoly theory, are too nu-
merous to count. Surprisingly, the number of papers that simultaneously model
Cournot competition between ﬁrms and the existence of intra-ﬁrm conﬂicts be-
tween owners and managers is rather small. In a recent AER paper, Raith
(2003, 1425) has described the two unresolved questions concerning managerial
incentives: how they are related to product market competition, and to risk.
According to Raith, in both of these ﬁelds further research is required to resolve
diﬀerences between theory and empirical evidence.
The most prominent idea in the literature on the relation between product
market competition and managerial incentives is that the former may serve as
a device to discipline managers, and thereby contribute to the solution of the
latter. This idea has already been brought about by Berle/Means (1932)
and Leibenstein (1966). Hart (1983) has rigorously derived conditions under
which increased product market competition can reduce “organizational slack”.
The driving force in his model is the information about his agent a principal
can gain from observing the competitors. This is also the core idea in Nale-
buff/Stiglitz (1983).3 Hermalin (1992) has extended this approach and
3In Gal-Or (1995), it is the payment schedule that has an informational (and a strategic)
4demonstrated that competition can provide incentives for managers to work
harder even if inference from market outcomes is excluded.
The empirical research on the relation between managerial incentives, com-
petition and ﬁrm’s performance is, to say the least, mixed. One example
of an empirical study is the paper by Nygaard/Myrveit (2000), in which
the authors have examined several types of contractual relations in Norway.
Gaver/Gaver/ Battistel (1992) have not found signiﬁcant stock market
reactions to the introduction of performance payment schemes for top man-
agers. Nickell (1996) acknowledges that there are some theoretical reasons
for the idea that product market competition improves corporate performance,
but they are “not overwhelming” and the empirical evidence is weak.
Arru˜ nada/Gonz´ ales (1997) have analyzed the impact of competition on
team production. They have set up a dynamic model which describes the how
competition between teams inﬂuences the eﬀort decisions. The driving force in
their model is the ability of honest team members to punish cheaters by leaving
the team. The mutual impact of competition and intra-team incentives is the
subject of the experimental paper by Bornstein/Gneezy (2002).4 However,
the intra-ﬁrm conﬂict in their paper is represented by two types of coordination
games to be played between the ﬁrm members. The members of the respective
teams play either a “chicken” game or a “coordination” game, while the teams
compete in a Bertrand market. However, in their model the intra-ﬁrm incentives
are exogenously given and constitute the type of the ﬁrm. In our model, both
market behavior and choice of intra-ﬁrm contracts are endogenous.
Another branch of the existing literature in this ﬁeld is concerned with
the macroeconomic eﬀects of imperfect product market competition, see Am-
able/ Gatti (2002), and with its impact on manager employment, see Am-
able/Gatti (2001), Fee/Hadlock (2000), and K¨ uhn (1994). The impact of
proﬁt-sharing on employment has been analyzed by Weitzman (1985), Stew-
art (1989) and Hart (1990).
Some other papers deal with isolated aspects of the interplay between intra-
ﬁrm incentives and competition: Glazer/Israel (1990) have demonstrated
that management compensation schemes can serve as a signaling mechanism on
the product market. Toulemonde (1999) has observed that wages may de-
ter potential competitors from market entry. Richards (1983) points out that
wage-spillovers should be taken into account when analyzing a market which
is characterized by a dominant ﬁrm and some smaller competitors. Goer-
ing/Harikumar (1999) describe how managers’ incentives to invest in long-
and short-run projects are aﬄicted by competition. Aggarwal/Samwick
(1999) come to the result that strategic interaction between the ﬁrms accounts
for the empirical lack of compensation schemes that are based upon relative
performance.
component in equilibrium.
4With further references concerning games between teams.
5A paper which is close to ours is Sklivas (1987).5 The author asks whether
ﬁrms in an oligopoly actually choose intra-ﬁrm incentives so as to maximize prof-
its. His results diﬀer substantially from ours: regarding quantity competition,
he derives that the existence of intra-ﬁrm conﬂicts implement market outcomes
that are more competitive than those in the Cournot model without intra-ﬁrm
conﬂicts. This result is driven by his assumption that contracts cannot be made
contingent on quantity outcomes. In his model, the agent’s payment depends
on a linear combination of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and returns.
The same assumption has been made by Fershtmann/Judd (1987). The
most striking result of these two papers is that, in their framework, it is not
optimal for principals in Cournot competition to oﬀer their agents incentive con-
tracts which are contingent on proﬁt maximization only. The optimal contract,
from the principals point of view, oﬀer rewards which are contingent on a linear
combination of proﬁt and returns. Both papers, however, do not make explicit
the incentive mechanism, and they neglect its impact on the ﬁrms’ costs. In our
paper, we explicitly model the incentive problem and include the agents’ wages
into the ﬁrms’ cost functions. Furthermore, both papers overlook the collusive
role a collective wage agreement can play, which is the subject of our model.
A further diﬀerence between these papers and ours is the nature of the intra-
ﬁrm contracts. Their contracts oﬀer the respective agent a linear combination
of a share of the return and a share of the proﬁt. Such a compensation scheme
perhaps reﬂects the situation of a top manager. As a consequence, the agents
act strategically interdependent. In our model, the principals oﬀer their agents
a combination of ﬁxed wage and piece rate. This compensation scheme is rather
adequate to describe the situation of a worker. The agents in our model, there-
fore, act independently from each other. Strategic interaction only occurs be-
tween the principals and the respective agents, between the principals in the
product market, and between the principals and the labor union.
Another paper which appears to be close to ours at the ﬁrst glance is Bensa¨ ıd/
Gary-Bobo (1991). In their model, however, proﬁt-sharing contract explicitly
plays no role with respect to intra-ﬁrm incentives. Eﬀort costs within the ﬁrm
are assumed to be zero. Therefore, proﬁt-sharing contracts are only an alter-
native to ﬁxed wages for satisfying the participation constraint. They focus on
the role of proﬁt-sharing as a commitment device that may establish or stabilize
strategic alliances. As in our model, the resulting game between the Cournot
oligopolists has a prisoners’ dilemma structure: even if it would be beneﬁcial to
the industry as a whole to use ﬁxed wage contracts only, each oligopolist’s best
reply is to use proﬁt-sharing. If, however, each oligopolist makes use of proﬁt
sharing, then each accrues a lower proﬁt than under the ﬁxed wage scheme.
The title of Haucap/Pauly/Wey (2001) could have been our title as well,
but their model highlights a diﬀerent anti-competitive aspect of collective wage
setting than our model does. They start with two types of ﬁrms in one industry,
5Reitman (1993) has chosen the same approach to analyze the impact of stock-options as
managerial compensation.
6one type produces with a labor-intensive technology, the other operates capital-
intensive. The latter type might ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to agree upon high wages in
a collective wage agreement, and to lobby for legally enforced inclusion of all
ﬁrms into this agreement. This raises rivals’ costs and increases the own market
share. In our model, the ﬁrms are homogeneous, and it is the wage structure
(piece rate vs. ﬁxed wage) that plays the crucial role.
We explicitly take the intra-ﬁrm conﬂict between owner and agent into ac-
count and model the eﬀort decision acknowledging eﬀort costs. Thus, our model
provides a link between wage scheme and the respective ﬁrm’s output. The pris-
oner’s dilemma in our model does not reﬂect suboptimal behavior in oligopoly,
but incentives to deviate from a cartel agreement.
3 The model
3.1 Setup
Consider a market with two ﬁrms, labeled 1 and 2. They use labor as the only
input factor. The amount of labor employed by ﬁrm i is denoted ei; i ∈ {1;2}.
The production functions are Yi(ei) = ei where Yi is the amount of output
produced by ﬁrm i. Providing the eﬀort level ei causes costs ci(ei) = e2
i. The
total amount produced in the market is denoted as Y , with Y = Y1 + Y2. The
consumers’ inverse demand is p = a − Y with a > 0, where p represents the
price charged by the ﬁrms.
We will refer to the ﬁrm owners as principals P1 and P2, and to the respective
input providers as agents A1 and A2. No other ﬁrms or agents may enter the
game. We assume all players to be risk neutral. Intra-ﬁrm incentive schemes
contingent on eﬀort are excluded by the assumption that eﬀort is not veriﬁable.6
We limit our view to ﬁxed wages and piece rates. If a contract oﬀer is rejected,
then the respective agent receives his outside option u ≥ 0.7
The two ﬁrms have, in principle, three ways to interact with each other:
• they can choose their strategies without coordination. We analyze this
duopoly game in section 3.2.
• They can try to coordinate their behavior without making use of an in-
stitutional framework to stabilize this coordination. The resulting cartel
game is analyzed in section 3.3. We ﬁrst derive the piece rate a cartel
would set in order to maximize its joint proﬁt, and we compute the ad-
ditional proﬁt generated by the cartel solution. Our analysis shows that
6The actual output may depend on eﬀort and a random variable, e.g., Yi = ei + ηi with
E(ηi) = 0 and σ2(ηi) > 0. If players are risk neutral, and limited liability problems can be
neglected (as it is assumed here), then each random variable can be replaced by its expected
value.
7For technical reasons we assume u < a2/5, only to guarantee that duopolists may ﬁnd it
interesting at all to engage in this market.
7this cartel solution is not an equilibrium, but can be stabilized by an
enforceable minimum wage agreement.
• Finally, the ﬁrms can negotiate with a labor union about a collective min-
imum wage agreement in the ﬁrst place. We analyze the third game in
section 3.4. Without such an agreement, the players enter the duopoly
game which is, hence, a subgame of the third game and constitutes the
threat points of the bargaining parties. With an agreement, the parties
enjoy the beneﬁts of the cartel solution derived in the second game. How-
ever, as the negotiations about the collective wage agreement involve the
labor union, the cartel has to share the additional proﬁt with its employ-
ees when applying the Nash bargaining solution to the ﬁrst stage of the
game.
We assume collective wage agreements to be perfectly enforceable: it is,
therefore, impossible to deviate downwards if such an agreement prevails (the
collective wage agreement imposes minimum wages). However, each employer
is free to oﬀer a higher compensation parameter to his agent.
3.2 Duopoly wages
In this section, we analyze uncoordinated behavior between the two ﬁrms. The
interaction takes place in three stages.
• The two principals Pi,i ∈ {1;2} oﬀer contracts (FD
i ,wD
i ) to their respec-
tive agent Ai. The index D indicates the duopoly situation.
• Each agent Ai decides whether to accept the contract oﬀer of his principal.
If he rejects it, he receives his outside option u and the respective principal
produces nothing.
• If, on the other hand, agent Ai accepts the contract oﬀer by his principal
Pi, he chooses his eﬀort ei. The output Yi(ei) is produced, the market
price for the good is determined, the total output is sold, and payoﬀs are
paid.
The Cournot solution in wages is derived by backwards induction. First,
we determine the optimal reaction of the respective agent to his principal’s
contract oﬀer. The eﬀort choice of the respective agent determines the ﬁrm’s
output. Then we analyze the wage setting game between the two ﬁrms (each of
them anticipating its agent’s reaction).
3.2.1 The agents’ choices
In the last stage, each of the agents Ai faces the following maximization problem:
e∗
i = argmax Fi + wiYi(ei) − ci(ei). With Yi = ei and ci = e2
i, the ﬁrst-order
8condition for an internal maximum is wi = 2ei. Hence, the optimal eﬀort
reaction of each agent to a wage oﬀer by his respective principal wi is
e∗
i(wi) =
wi
2
. (1)
In the third stage, each agent decides whether to accept the respective contract.
Anticipating his own later eﬀort reaction, agent i expects, when accepting the
contract, a payoﬀ that amounts to Fi + wiYi[e∗
i(wi)] − ci[e∗
i(wi)]. Using the
production function and eﬀort cost, this equals Fi − w2
i/4. Agent Ai accepts if
this payoﬀ exceeds his outside option u. Therefore,
Fi(wi) = u − w2
i/4 (2)
is the minimal ﬁxed wage that obeys the participation constraint of agent Ai.
3.2.2 Contract oﬀers in the duopoly
Using equations (1) and (2), the choice problem of each principal in stage 2 of our
game can be reduced to one in piece rates wi and wj. In the subgame without a
collective wage agreement, both principals do not have to obey legal constraints
when choosing their piece rate oﬀer. They anticipate that at least a ﬁxed wage
of Fi = u−(w2
i/4) is required to make an oﬀer wi acceptable for their respective
agent. Moreover, they anticipate that this oﬀer will implement ei = wi/2 as
their agent’s eﬀort choice. Thus, the proﬁt function of principal i in the Cournot
duopoly subgame is ΠD
i (wi,wj) = [p(ei(wi) + ej(wj)) − wi]ei(wi) − Fi with
i,j ∈ {1;2} and i 6= j. This yield function can, by making use of the results
derived above, be rewritten as
ΠD
i (wi,wj) =

a − b
wi + wj
2
− wi

wi
2
−

u −
w2
i
4

.
Each ﬁrm chooses its piece rate in order to maximize its proﬁt. The ﬁrst-order
condition for ﬁrm i, given an internal solution exists, is a/2 − wi − wj/4 = 0.
Hence, the optimal reaction of ﬁrm i to the other ﬁrm’s choice wj is
wD
i (wj) =
2a − wj
4
. (3)
Substituting wj(wi) into equation (3) yields the Cournot duopoly solution wD
i =
wD
j = 2a/5. The corresponding minimal ﬁxed wages are FD
i = u − a2/25.
By oﬀering (FD
i ,wD
i ), both ﬁrms implement an individual output of eD
i =
a/5. The market output, thus, amounts to Y D = 2a/5, and the market price is
pD = 3a/5. Each ﬁrm’s proﬁt then accrues to ΠD
i = 2a2/25 − u. The agents
receive their outside option u.
In equilibrium, the return of ﬁrm i is computed as RD
i = (a − eD
i − eD
j )eD
i .
The marginal return then is MRD
i = a − eD
j − 2eD
i . Anticipating both agents’
9reactions, the marginal return can also be expressed in wages, namely MRD
i =
a − wi − wj/2. Substitution of the equilibrium piece rates yields MRD
i =
2a/5. In equilibrium, both ﬁrms therefore choose piece rates equal to their
marginal returns. Thus, the piece rate is set eﬃciently, seen from the individual’s
perspective.
3.3 Cartel wages and the instability problem
In this section we analyze the two ﬁrms’ attempt to coordinate their behavior
without ﬁrst entering into the institutional framework of a legally enforceable
collective wage agreement. We assume that the two ﬁrms may agree upon
piece rates and ﬁxed wages before making their individual oﬀers to their agents.
However, such an agreement is not binding (we introduce enforceable agreements
in the next section).
The agents’ eﬀort choices are governed by the same reaction functions as
derived above, see equation (1), which is anticipated by the cartel members.
Hence, we can limit the analysis to the ﬁrms’ choices. We proceed in three
steps:
• ﬁrst, we derive what piece rates a cartel would set in order to generate the
maximum proﬁt.
• Then we show that this cartel solution is not an equilibrium.
• Finally we demonstrate that an enforceable minimum wage agreement
would stabilize the cartel solution.
3.3.1 Optimal piece rates in the cartel
A monopolist who produces in two production sites with increasing marginal
costs has a proﬁt function:
ΠC = [p(ei(wi) + ej(wj)) − wi]ei − Fi + [p(ei(wi) + ej(wj)) − wj]ej − Fj.
The anticipated reactions of the two agents employed by the cartel are the same
as derived above. Therefore, we can simplify the cartel’s proﬁt to
ΠC =
a(wi + wj) − w2
i − w2
j − wiwj
2
− 2u.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for an internal solution are (a−2wi −wj)/2 = 0 and
(a − 2wj − wi)/2 = 0. A cartel planner has to choose (wi,wj) such that these
conditions are simultaneously fulﬁlled. Imagine the planner considers a certain
value of wj; his optimal “reaction” wi is described by
wC
i (wj) =
a − wj
2
. (4)
10The planner’s equilibrium is characterized by the intersection of the planning
curves wC
i (wj) and wC
j (wi). Compare the planning curve to the reaction curve
of a Cournot duopolist (see equation 3 above) who picks his piece rate in a
decentralized choice. It is obvious that both sets of curves (in a wi-wj-diagram)
have the same intercept, namely a/2, but diﬀerent slopes: the cartel planning
curves are steeper than the Cournot reaction curves. The relation between these
two sets of curves is depicted in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1: Cournot reaction and cartel planning
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The proﬁt maximizing piece rates for both production sites of the cartel is
wC
i = wC
j = a/3. The corresponding minimum ﬁxed wage that induces the
agents to accept their contract oﬀer is, for both ﬁrms, FC
i = u − a2/36. Hence,
FC
i > FD
i .
A contract oﬀer (FC
i ,wC
i ) induces eﬀorts eC
i = eC
j = a/6. Thus, the cartel
produces Y C = a/3 as its total output. The market price then is pC = 2a/3, and
the individual proﬁts of the two cartel members amount to ΠD
i = 43a2/450−u.
As members of the cartel, the two ﬁrms collect higher proﬁts than the Cournot
11duopolists: ΠC
i > ΠD
i . In the cartel optimum, each ﬁrms’ revenues are computed
as
MRC
i = a −
wC
j
2
− wC
i = a/2.
Obviously, the cartel solution is characterized by MRC
i > wC
i . The marginal
revenue of each ﬁrm exceeds the piece rate oﬀered to its agent. Individually
eﬃcient would be a piece rate equal to the marginal revenue. In this sense, the
cartel would agree upon wages that create ineﬃcient intra-ﬁrm incentives. Table
1 compares the results of the decentralized Cournot model and the centralized
cartel planning.
Table 1: The main results of Cournot and cartel
Cournot duopoly cartel comparison
wi 2a/5 a/3 wD
i > wC
i
minimal Fi u − a2/25 u − a2/36 FD
i < FC
i
ei a/5 a/6 eD
i > eC
i
Y 2a/5 a/3 Y D > Y C
p 3a/5 2a/3 pD < pC
Πi 2a2/5 − u 43a2/450 − u ΠD
i < ΠC
i
Π 4a2/25 − 2u 43a2/225 − 2u ΠC − ΠD = 7a2/450 > 0
MRi(ei) 2a/5 a/2 MRD
i = wD
i ;MRC
i > wC
i
3.3.2 Incentives to deviate from a collective wage agreement
We have demonstrated three results so far:
• the Cournot duopoly game in outputs can be restated as a game in wages
if the ﬁrms face an intra-ﬁrm incentive problem. The piece rate determines
the respective ﬁrm’s (expected) output.
• In the duopoly situation, the ﬁrms under consideration would choose a
piece rate wD
i = 2a/5, while the cartel would pay a smaller piece rate,
namely w = a/3, and thereby reduce the collective output.
• Even though the cartel members are required to pay a higher ﬁxed wage
to their agents than in the Cournot oligopoly, cartelization would increase
the group proﬁt by ΠC − ΠD = 7a2/225.
The desirability of the cartel solution, however, does not imply that it is
stable. As it is shown in ﬁgure 1, the optimal cartel choice does not lie on
the Cournot reaction curves. Moreover, the cartel piece rate is smaller than
each cartel member’s marginal revenue. Hence, both cartel members have an
12incentive to deviate upwards from the cartel agreement in the second stage of
the game.
In this section we demonstrate that a collective agreement about minimum
wages forms an eﬀective obstacle against such deviation, even though it allows
for upwards deviations. A cartel member who tries to oﬀer a higher piece rate
simultaneously wishes to pay a lower ﬁxed wage which, however, is prohibited
by the collective wage agreement. We demonstrate that no incentive exists to
increase the piece rate without decreasing the ﬁxed wage.
Figure 2 illustrates the intra-ﬁrm incentives. First of all, the ﬁgure shows
the participation constraint of agent Ai. The participation constraint consists
of Fi-wi combinations which leave the agent with an (expected) payoﬀ equal to
u. It is a downward sloped curve with intercept u at the Fi-axis. The agent
prefers Fi-wi-combinations above the participation constraint, as indicated by
the tiny arrow.
Furthermore, ﬁgure 2 shows the cartel solution (point C) and the duopoly
solution (point D). In addition to this, the area to the north-east of C depicts
the compensation parameter combinations the ﬁrms are allowed to oﬀer under
a collective minimum wage agreement (this area is called “permitted deviations
from C”).
The last component of ﬁgure 2 is the iso-proﬁt curve of ﬁrm Pi that represents
its individual proﬁt level in the cartel solution. Denote this proﬁt level as ΠC
i .
In general, a ﬁrm’s iso-proﬁt curve in a Fi-wi-diagram for the proﬁt level Πi is
given by
Fi =
2a − wj
4
wi −
3
4
w2
i − Πi.
The cartel situation is characterized by wj = a/3 and Πi = ΠC
i , and the iso-
proﬁt curve of Pi can be simpliﬁed to
Fi =
5a
12
wi −
3
4
w2
i − ΠC
i .
The ﬁrst derivative of this iso-proﬁt curve with respect to wi is
∂Fi
∂wi
=
5a
12
−
3
2
wi.
If the other ﬁrm sets the cartel wage wj = a/3, then the iso-proﬁt curves of
Pi have their maximum at wi = 5a/18. Note that wi < wC
i . For wi > 5a/18,
the iso-proﬁt curve representing ΠC
i has negative slope, but is ﬂatter than the
agent’s participation constraint, and the two curves intersect in point C, the
optimal cartel combination.
Principal Pi prefers wage combinations below his iso-proﬁt curves, as the
tiny arrow indicates. Hence, the iso-proﬁt curve and the participation con-
straint open up a “lens” between them which contains wage combinations that
are bilaterally beneﬁcial, compared to the collective wage agreement, for the
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principal and his agent. Even though the collective wage agreement maximizes
their joint proﬁt, both ﬁrms have an incentive to deviate and generate a higher
individual proﬁt, combined with a negative externality that burdens the other
ﬁrm.
A unilateral deviation is only attractive if it consists of an increased piece
rate and a lowered ﬁxed wage - a move towards south-east in ﬁgure 2. The col-
lective minimum wage agreement, however, only allows the principals to deviate
towards north-east. The only intersection between the lens and permitted devi-
ations is the point C itself. The collective wage agreement, therefore, eﬀectively
implements a “ﬁxed wage brake” against the temptation to deviate.
143.4 The collective wage agreement
In the previous sections we have demonstrated that a cartel agreement with
FC
i and wC
i attains a monopoly solution and, thereby, maximizes the ﬁrms’
value. Furthermore, it is stable if downwards deviations are eﬀectively prohib-
ited. Hence, it generates an agreement rent between the parties of the collective
wage agreement. In this section, we derive the symmetric Nash-bargaining so-
lution.8 The game now consists of four stages:
1. The employers’ association representing ﬁrms P1 and P2 bargains with
the labor union (which represents workers A1 and A2) over a collective
wage agreement. Such an agreement consists of a minimum ﬁxed wage,
denoted FB, and a minimum piece rate wB (the index B denotes that
these contract parameters are the result of a bargaining process). This
stage may end with or without an agreement.
2. The two principals separately oﬀer “their” agent a contract (Fi,wi). If
no agreement was concluded during the ﬁrst stage, the players enter the
Cournot duopoly game analyzed in section 3.2. The outcome of this game,
therefore, constitutes the threat points of the bargaining parties. If, on
the other hand, a collective wage agreement (FB,wB) was closed, then
each individual oﬀer must obey the constraints Fi ≥ FB and wi ≥ wB.
3. Each agent chooses whether to accept the oﬀer made by “his” principal.
If an agent rejects his principal’s oﬀer, he earns his outside option u ≥ 0,
and the respective principal produces nothing.
4. If Ai has accepted the contract, he chooses his eﬀort ei. Yi(ei) is produced,
the market price for the good is determined, the produced amounts of the
good are sold, and payoﬀs are paid to all the agents and the principals.
We have already demonstrated in section 3.3 that a stable cartel agreement
increases the joint payoﬀ. According to the Nash bargaining solution, this agree-
ment rent is distributed between the negotiating parties via a ﬁxed wage that
may exceed the minimal ﬁxed wage in the cartel situation: FB ≥ FC
i . The piece
rate, on the other hand, is not subject to negotiations, since only wB = wC
i
maximizes the ﬁrms’ joint proﬁt, which is a prerequisite to satisfy the axiom of
Pareto-superiority.
(FB−FC
i ) ≥ 0 is the additional ﬁxed wage each ﬁrm pays under the collective
wage agreement. The union’s share of the agreement rent, therefore, amounts
to 2(FB − FC
i ). The employers association’s share is computed as follows:
each ﬁrm receives the cartel proﬁt minus the additional rent, and gives up the
disagreement payoﬀ, namely the duopoly proﬁt. Hence, the employers’ share is
8Alternative concepts to this model of collective wage negotiations would be the “monopoly
labor union” or the “right-to-manage” approach, see the survey in Espinosa/Rhee (1989).
For the main results of our paper, the solution concept applied to the bargaining stage is
immaterial.
152[ΠC
i − (FB − FC
i ) − ΠD
i ]. Therefore, the symmetric Nash bargaining solution
can be derived as
ˆ FB = argmax 4[ΠC
i − (FB − FC
i ) − ΠD
i ][FB − FC
i ].
The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution is ΠC
i −ΠD
i +2(FC
i −FB)
! = 0,
and the optimum is attained at
ˆ FB =
ΠC
i − ΠD
i
2
+ FC
i
Substitution of the results derived above (see table 1) yields FB = u−a2/50,
which exceeds FC
i . The individual proﬁt of each ﬁrm is smaller than in a cartel
without the collective wage agreement (ΠB
i < ΠC
i ), but exceeds the individual
duopoly proﬁt: ΠB
i > ΠD
i .
Figure 3 demonstrates the situation under a collective wage agreement (FB,wB),
represented by point B. As the collective wage agreement consists of a higher
ﬁxed wage, the derivation area is shifted upwards, compared to the cartel so-
lution. The lower proﬁt level corresponds with a higher iso-proﬁt curve (for
wj = a/3). Since the agent’s participation constraint remains unmodiﬁed, the
lens becomes greater. Nevertheless, as ﬁgure 3 shows, the only intersection be-
tween lens and the permitted deviations area is the point B itself. Thus, there is
no bilaterally beneﬁcial deviation which is permitted under the collective wage
agreement.
4 Conclusion
We have set up a model that combines a Cournot duopoly with intra-ﬁrm con-
ﬂicts in the context of a simple moral hazard model. We have derived the
Cournot equilibrium in wages. We also have derived the wages an enforceable
cartel (with two production sites and convex marginal costs) would choose. The
cartel would choose lower variable wages, in order to reduce output, and pay a
higher ﬁxed wage.
The cartel wage structure, however, does not constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Insofar, the wage cartel does not diﬀer from the production quota
cartel. But there is one important diﬀerence between these two settings: while
the quota cartel is illegal, a collective wage agreement can legally be enforced.
The distribution of the cartel rent between the two ﬁrms and a labor union
according to the Nash bargaining solution requires a side payment to the beneﬁt
of the union (or its members). This side payment may take the form of a higher
ﬁxed wage.
The principal-agent model we have employed here is rather simple, yet suﬃ-
cient to derive the basic insights. There are many options to enrich the model.
16Figure 3: Intra-ﬁrm incentives with collective wage agreement
-
wi
6
Fi
participation constraint
6
u
wi
iso-proﬁt ΠB
i
FB B
?
C
permitted deviations from B
lens
wC
i = wB
FC
i
D
wD
i
FD
i
E.g., we could introduce risk-aversion on the side of the agent. However, this
would only reinforce the derived results.
The insights of this paper are relevant for strategic management considera-
tions. They also may contribute a solution to the “ﬁxed wage puzzle”: while
economic theory strongly favors variable payment, ﬁxed wages are omnipresent
in the real world. According to our results, ﬁrms in an oligopoly situation have
an incentive to pay higher ﬁxed and lower variable wages than isolated ﬁrms.
Such an incentive structure would appear ineﬃcient when the analysis neglects
the strategic competition on the product market.
Moreover, the results of this paper are relevant for economic policy, and in
particular for regulation of competition. Cartel authorities should not only look
at direct cartel agreements when trying to identify illegal collusive behavior.
Collective wage agreements may also be suspicious, in particular if they provide
intra-ﬁrm incentives that appear ineﬃcient at the ﬁrst glance.
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